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The second point is that I am not sure that those using the actors based
approach are definitely a minority; even if this is what one can derive from a
quick scan of the international political science journals. The point is that the
vast majority of analyses are not only done in domestic policy fields in national
languages, but are done by individuals that are not academic researchers (the
ones that write and read scientific journals). Sometimes these analyses are not
even written down but are discussed in more or less open meetings in which
the interested parties gather in order to find solutions to real problems. I
suspect that their approach is more similar to our than sometimes we think,
and that, as a matter of fact, the whole process is very different indeed from
what the followers of the lIcomparative politics approach to policy analysis ll
assume is actually happening. Actually this is more than a suspicion, as I have
participated myself in such meetings and I have found that our conceptual
tools, if they are not used in a scholastic way, can actually be useful in order to
help the understanding and the development of this process and can easily be
grasped by the real policy makers. In other words the real problem is not if the
actor based approach is dominant in the scientific community, but if it is
dominant in the policy making community...
This brings me to the third point, i.e. the fact that the job description of a
political scientist, and any other scientist, for that matter, includes teaching.
And the product of this teaching c'llnot be solely the production of other
researchers. This of course is one part of the outcome but only a part and
possibly not the biggest. We actually teach, and in Peter Knoepfel's· Gase this
has been a ch~oice made many years ago, to people that are likely to become, and
sometimes already are, policy actors. This is what makes teaching interesting;
as some of these people have already a knowledge of how the game is played
that can be compared with what we have elaborated in our books and articles.
And even if they are young students, the purpose of teaching policy is actually
to improve their chances to be able to influence, when they will enter the real
world, the policy processes in which they will fmd themselves involved. When
I was hired by the Politecnico di Milano in the Planning Department, someone
explained to me that the dominant philosophy of the university was that the
teachers should actually try to involve themselves in real projects - building
houses and bridges, designing machinery, etc. - basically because no one trusts
an engineering or architectural professor that has never been active in realising
some real projects. From time to time I wonder what, apart from the use of
sophisticated conceptual tools, some of our more mainstream colleagues are
actually able to teach to their students.
Summing up, and going back to the main argument of this short paper, in
my opinion the attention devoted to resources, and to the use of law, in Peter
Knoepfel's scientific programme, is a consequence and a reflection of his
reformist approach. The idea that providing conceptual frameworks, analytic
tools, evidence and insights able to ease the solution of real world problems is
not only the "right" thing to do by a socially responsible scholar, but it is also
much more fun than the alternative.
CHAPTER 2




"What explains thts singular habit if respecting laws which only a few
'abnormal' people ~bey only when compelled to do so?" Can thi~ habit be explained
by.coercIve sanctIOns? The fear they instil, or the threats they represent? The
gUIlt. and shame they evoke? In short, do we respect laws because of the
emotIOns they stir within us?
Th~s is certainly part of the answer, though not the e,ntire answer. The
authorIty ?f law st~ms not fro~ co~rcio~ alone. EX~lanations vary depending
on t?e pomt of .vIew: neuroscIentIsts CIte the actIvation of cerebral zones
spe~Ific to compl~a~ce with norms,s psychologists the emotions, sociologists
SOCIal norms, ethICIsts the sense of values, theologians morality, economists
efficiency; psychiatrists the superego, and so on. '
Compliance with soft law
I.f compliance with hard law is not easy to explain, compliance with soft
law IS .ev~n m.ore complex. It is astonishing-to a legal mind at least-that certain
non-bmdmg mstruments, such as recommendations, declarations information
~nd persuasion activities, gentlemen's agreements, charters and other incentive
Instruments, compel respect. The rules of soft law may; in practice, be
respec~ed regardless of w~ether or not they are of a legal nature. The rate of
~omphance does vary; as It does widely with binding instruments: "In some
Instances, compliance with non-binding norms and instruments is extremely
good and probably would not have been better if the norms were contained in
• 1 This .text is the short version of an article published in the Revue europeenne des
sczences s~clales, 2009, 144, p. 73ss entitled "Pourquoi respectons-nous la soft law? Le r&le
des emotions et des techniques de manipulation."
. .il.[Trans.] Gaudemet, J., in Papaux, Alain, Essai philosophique sur la qualification
Jundtque: de la subsomption d l'abduction: l'exempte du droit international prive, Brussels
Cetc.J 2008, p. 215.
sSpitzer, M. et al., "The neural signature of social norm compliance," Neuron 2007,
.56, p. 185ss. In. neuro-marketing (relationship between sales and cerebral zones), See
Lee, N./ BroderlCk, All Chamberlain, L., 'What is 'neuromarketing'? A discussion and
agenda for future research," Internationaljournal of psychophysiology 2007,63, p. 199ss.
The role of emotions in persuasion techniques
The concept of emotion is not easily defined. Still today, many references
are made to the six basic emotions "identified by Paul Ekman: anger, fear,
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disgust, joy, sadness and surprise;7 Research in the field has only made the
concept more complex by distinguishing emotions from other affects such as
feelings, passions or moods by categorizing and broadening them to such an
extent that it is impossible to find a unanimously recognized definition today.s
Emotion and reason: Two readings of the same reality
Emotion is not opposed to rationality; but interwoven closely with it. Far
from interfering, emotion helps us make rational decisions in situations of
uncertainty; for example.9 Emotion can also be described as rational. lO It
follows, therefore, that it is more appropriate to imagine different ways of
reading the same reality: while it is reasonable to drive on the right side of
continental roads, an emotional reading of the issue might focus on the fear of
an accident (not to mention a fine), The rational choice theory might lead
someone to prefer a solution that involves deliberately breaking the law, if this
is less costly in terms of both money and image, as studies in law and
economics have theorized.1 ! On the other hand, an emotional reading would
show that desire for wealth, greed or fear of impoverishment would weigh
more than pride and honour in compliance with law or the embarrassment that
guilt stemming from a violation might evoke, The opposition between reason
and emotion is in fact used for persuasive purposes in all decision-making
processes, whether legal, political, economic or other: an individual who calls
another to reason is actually trying to show him that his decision may be based
on other emotions that could prevail or that certain emotions can be appeased,
As such, the intention is not to oppose reason and emotion, but to probe the
emotional variable in the mechanisms at work with observation of rules.
Although this perspective is restrictive, it opportunely completes more
conventional political, sociological and economic analyses,
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4< Shelton, Dinah, "Soft Law," Handbook of International Law, Routledge Press,
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6 See, for example, studies showing that the existence of an obligation to wear
seatbelts results in a far greater change in behaviour than a s'imple recommendation
(Killias, Martin, Precis de criminologie, 2nd Ed., Berne 2001, p. 453ss).
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a binding text. lt 4< The Joint Declaration of the European Ministers of
Education convened in Bologna on June 19, 1999 (Bologna Declaration), a non-
binding instrument, is an example of the potentially powerful effects of soft
law. This text was followed and implemented much more effectively and
quickly in universities than the rule imposing a fine on pedestrians who use a
bicycle path when a sidewalk is available. This is a remarkable phenomenon for
a jurist: rules of law, though compulsory, are sometimes less respected than
rules of soft law, although clearly rules of hard law are often more effective
than rules of soft law taken in isolation,5 and soft law is by far not always as
effective. The most marked effect certainly results from a combination of rules
of law, their enforcement and soft law instruments. Neither a compulsory
nature nor a penalty alone is a determining factor in the analysis of compliance
with rules.
The need to legitimize the State's non~normativeaction
Since a non-compulsory rule may be enough to change individuals'
behaviour, the State has made a habit of using such rules in addition to, or
instead of, conventional legal instruments. This circumvents the burdensome
legal processes that apply to rules of law and contributes to strengthen the
State's hold. The phenomenon is not a new one. There are traces of it, for
example, in Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality.6 However, its
originality resides in jurists' awareness of the power of these "weak"
instruments, with the legal system conveniently brandishing their non-legal
nature as an excuse to avoid addressing the legality or constitutionality of such
instruments. The challenge, then, is to convince the State to develop appropriate
legitimation mechanisms. Constitutional law did so in the past by democratizing
law and subjecting it to requirements of precision and the control of
constitutionality; while administrative law did so by requiring procedural
guarantees for the adoption of administrative decisions or certain plans.
With this end in mind, we will explore how soft law exerts its influence.
We will detail these mechanisms from a psychological perspective. The role of
emotions in persuasion techniques as well as manipulation techniques that
affect individuals' behaviour without their knowledge will then be examined.
12 Lange, Bettina, "The Emotional Dimension in Legal Regulation," Journal of Law
and Society, March 2002, p. 197ss, 209. ., _ ,,'
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Bandes, Susan (Ed.), The Passion of Law, New York, 2000, p. 242.
a Deigh, John, "Emotion and the Authority of Law," in Bandes, Susan (Ed.), The
Passion of Law, New York, 2000, p. 285ss. .
16 Posner, Eric, Law and Social Norms, Cambridge Mass 2000; Posner, ErIc (Ed.),
Social Norms, Nonlegal Sanctions, and the Law, Chel~en~am, Northampton 2007;
O'Donnell, Patrick, "Social Norms & Law: An IntroductlOn, Theory & SCience 2007,
vo1. 9/2. h "
16 Petty, R./ DeSteno, DJ Rucker, n, "The role of affect in attitude c ange,
Forgas, Joseph (Ed.), Handbook of affect and social cognition, Mahwah ~OOl, p. 2~2SS:'
Petty, Richard/ Gleicher, Faith/ Baker, Sara, "Multiple roles of affect III persuaslOll,
Forgas, Joseph (Ed.), Affect and Judgme~t, Lond~n 1~91, p. 181SS.. .
17 Elster, Jon, Alchemies of the Mmd: RatIonalIty and the Emo~lOns, c~mb~ld?e
1999, p. 145ss. In Gagne's view (Gagne, Learry, "Non-ra.tional complIance WIth soclal
norms: sincere and hypocritical," Social Science Infor~atIon .2007,46, p. 445ss), based
on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, non-rational compltance IS more acceptable to the
group than sincere compliance.
18 Elster 1999 [note 17J, p. 149.
Emotion at the service of compliance with hard and soft law
To improve compliance with soft Jaw, the State can ~se vari~uspersuasio.n
techniques by appealing more or less strongly to emotIOns. ThIS ap~ro~ch IS
not original, to the extent that the role of emotio~s can, b~ ~hown e.a~lly III the
application of conventional law: ,criminal law, .i~ l~S pnmltl~e pumtIve aspe~t
(confmement, exclusion, impoverIshment, hUm~IatlOn, sun:enng and death), IS
designed to inspire fear,1:& anxiety and terror m the pu~hc, as well as evoke
shame embarrassment or guilt among those found gmlty, and assu~ge the
anger' rage and desire for vengeance felt by victims in order to Impose
compiiance with the rule of law. The justiciable ?bey law because of .an
emotional tie, which for some involves fear of pUDlshment or the re~ultmg
shame,lS and for others, positive emotions such as respect for or commItment
to the public good. a Fear of punishment, however, is far from the only
explanatory factor.
In the context of soft law, research on compliance with social ~or~s16 and
persuasion techniques I6 are of great interest. Observance of non~bllldl~grules
cannot be explained solely by the rational choice theory, but IS attrlbuta~le
essentially to emotional mechanisms,. par~icularly anticipat~on .of sham~, gm:;
or embarrassment in the event of vIOlatIOn as well as pnde m complIance,
with shame being evoked by others' disgust or scorn. 18
The emotional reading is but one possible reading of rule ~omp~iance
mechanisms. Although it has a high potential to explain changes III attItude,
consideration must be given to other levers that a purely emotIOn~l appro~ch
only partially explains. That is why,. in. t?e second pa~t,. we wIll examl~e
manipulation techniques that prompt mdlvlduals to unw1ttmgly change th.elr
behaviour. Some research also gives less importance to the effect ~f emotIO.n
(in this case, fear of punishment) in compliance with law. Accordmg to thIS
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21 Killias, Martin, precis de criminolog£e, 2nd Ed., Berne 2001, p. 457s et 467ss for
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22 Tyler 2006 [note 19J, 4e from cover.
23 [Trans.J Lalande, Andre, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, Paris
1993 (1st Ed. 1926), under the entry for "normatif." See also Amselek 1991, p. 143.
24 FIUckiger 2004 [note 6J, p. 230.
26 FIUckiger 2004 [note 6J, p. 190.
26 Tercier, Pierre, ad art. 45 LCart, ch. 45, p. 948 and Martenet, Vincent, ad art. 8
LMr, ch. 8, p. 1392, in Tercier, P.; Bovet, C. (Ed.), Droit de la concurrence: loi sur les cartels,
loi sur la surveillance des prix, loi sur le marchi interieur, loi sur us entraves techniques au
commerce: commentaire, Geneva, etc. 2002.
27 [Trans.J Bonvin, Jacques, ad art. 14 LSPr, ch. 40, p. 1172, in Tercier, P.; Bovet, C.
2002 [cites earlier noteJ.
The emotional motives for obeying soft law
The non-compulsory dfect if sqft law
Because soft law is not a legal norm, it has no binding effect. Its effect is
rather to modify the behaviour of the targeted groups without legally
requiring them to do so. Yet, it retains its normative nature, since the norm is
not necessarily imperative. In fact, normativity must not be confused with
imperativity: "The normative is a genus with two main species: the imperative and the
appreciative."2s The behaviour of soft law's targeted audience is left to their
own appreciation.u As such, the normative nature of soft law is appreciative
rather than imperative. It arises not from "Sollen l1 (must be), but rrSollten"
(should be)."
Obedience if authority
The first effect stems from the ascendancy or prestige of the author's
figure and the emotions thus evoked (diffuse fear, desire to please or need for
recognition, admiration). A recommendation from a public authority has more
weight than the same advice from an unknown person or an obscure
association. This is the case, for example, with recommendations by the
Competition Commission26 or the Surveillant des prix, which "at least has a
certain moral weight. "27
A bet is made on the author's influence when authorities deliberately adopt
an exemplary behaviour as part of public policy (sorting waste, renovating
work, law is observed when individuals believe in its legitimacy19-defined
procedurally2°-bycomplying spontaneously with it,21 Moral, ethical and
justice-related explanations find in this type of work a welcome foundation: I
personally don't kill other humans, not because I fear the criminal penalty, but
from a personal conviction of the correctness, fairness and legitimacy of that
rule. Hence, there is no point in the legislator escalating implementation
mechanisms to distil fear, instead of making the legal system more worthy of
respect by improving its legitimacy.22
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public buildings for energy efficiency), giving individuals a model to follow and
accustoming them in the hope of sweeping them along. Citizens perceive the
State's publicity of its new behaviour as a real recommendation to adopt the
same attitude.i!8
Research in social psychology on obedience shows the importance of the
weight individuals give to a figure of authority,29 regardless of whether there
is a mandatory legal relationship,so Credible sources are more convincing. For
example, experts have proven to be influential within the framework of anti-
smoking campaigns.sI
Some non-binding instruments are adopted, drafted and formulated like
binding instruments, resulting in a bluff effect on the intended audience.52
Here, obedience is the product of a transfer, as it were, where secret hopes are
invested in the normative power of the written word55 or where the solemnity
of the adoption procedure is impressive, as with some non-binding
international declarationsS4 like the Rio Declaration (environment) or the
Bologna Declaration (education).
In other cases, respect for authority is strategic. It may arise from the need
to foster a climate of trust by maintaining harmonious relations with the
administration, a determining factor in non-binding arrangements (or
gentlemen's agreements).56 The fear of a deterioration in relations leads to
compliance with non-binding instruments. This motive is particularly strong
in public international law, where the necessity of maintaining good relations
among States means that violating a purely political commitment may result in
a range of retaliatory measures.56
28 FlUckiger 2004 [note 6J, p. 2015.
29 Girandola, Fabien, "La source," in Girandola, Psychologie de la persuasion et de
l'engagement, Besant;:on 2003, p. 17s8.
so Milgram's experiment where subjects were pushed to obey inhumane orders
must be understood from the perspective of hard law, to the extent that the
experimentor gave them direct orders (Milgram, Stanley, "Behavioral Study of
Obedience," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67,1963, p. 371ss).
51 Falomir Pichastor, Juan Manuel! Mugny, Gabriel, Societe contre fumeur: une
analyse psychosociale de 11influence des experts, Grenoble, 2004.
S2 Fllickiger 2004 [note 6J, p. 247.
ss Tschannen, Pierre, Der Richtplan und die Abstimmung raumwirksamer Aufgabe,
Berne, let. e, p. 325.
$4 Nguyen Quoc Dinh/ Daillier, Patrick/ Pellet, Alain, Public International Law,
7th Ed, Paris 2002, ch. 247, p. 378. J
S6 Kautz, StefIen, Absprachen im Verwaltungsrecht: ZuHtssigkeit, Grenzen und
Folgen, Berlin 2002, p, 80S; Mliller-Graf, Thomas, Entrechtlichung, durch
Informalisierung? ein Beitrag zur Handlungsformen- und zur Rechtsverhaltnislehre im
Verwaltungsrecht, BlUe, etc. 2001, p. 173s.
S6 Virally, Michel, 'La distinction entre textes internationaux de portre juridique et
textes internationaux depourvus de portee juridique (a l'exception des textes emanant
des organisations internationales): rapport provisoire," Annuaire de l'Institut de droit
international, voL 60, tome I, Paris 1983, p. 231s.
This effect is so wide-ranging that the legislator itself sometimes feels
bound by soft law, at least politically. In public international law
"rec0m.mendations can be .h~'ghly restrictive from a political standpoint. They are a~
und.enwble means of polltlcal pressure. "S7 There is also a similar psychological
baSIS for the model law and model treaty technique, in which a higher authority
proposes to follow a model law to standardize a practice in areas where it may
not be competent,58
Fear
. Fear an~ anxiety are powerful vectors of obedience. A State has only to
WIeld t~e~ m soft law instruments to strongly encourage the target audience
to modIfy ItS ?ehaviour. While it is generally true that the greater the fear, the
more persuaSIve the message, psychologists and criminologists in particular
have attempted to show the limitations of this approach,59
Fear ~an be related to other negative emotions that strengthen its impact
such as dIsg~st,.aversion, indignation, anger or sadness. For example, fear of
global. warmmg s eff~cts can lead to sadness or anger, while in anti-smoking
campaIgns, .fear of .dIsease can be accentuated by revolting images.4o These
ot?e~ negative emotIOns alone can certainly influence behaviour: I refrain from
splttmg because. I feel di~gust when I see spittle on the ground, not necessarily
because I ~ear dIsappro:mg looks or other social penalties. In other words, my
own ~verslOn to behavIOurs that offend my sensitivities and sense of justice
and fairness keep me from adopting them.
This is the Case with many information campaigns in the area of public
health: the fear of death, disease, decline or shame in AIDS prevention· fear of
the sho.rtage .of or~ans in campaigns to promote organ donation;' fear of
cancer 1ll an.tl-smokmg campaigns; fear of endangering the health of the
elderl!, the sICk and babies in information campaigns during heat waves; fear
of dymg f~rests ~nd global warming in environmental protection campaigns;ol>j
fear of aCCIdents In awareness campaigns for road safety or occupational safety;
. 37 [Tr~ns.J ,Ngu;:-e~ 2~02 [note 34J, ch. 247, p.378. See along the same lines
yIrally, ~lchel, La dIstinctIOn entre t~xt~s. internationaux de portee juridique et textes
mterr:atI~naux.depour:us de portee Jurldlque (a l'exception des textes emanant des
~rgams~tlons mternatIonales): rapport provisoire," Annum're de l'Institut de droit
lnternatto~a~ voL 60, tome I, Paris 1983, p. 233, for whom purely political commitments
are sometImes more restrictive than legal commitments.
"See Fluckiger 2004 [note 61, p. 2008.
59 Petty et aI. 2001 ~no~e 16~, p. 217s~; Leventhal, H., "Findings and theory in the
study of fear commUnICatIOns, BerkowItz, L. (Ed.), Advances in experim.ental social
psychology, vol. 5., 1970, p. 1208S. See also the thesis of Tyler 2006 [note 19J and Killias
2001 [note 21J.
4{l See the reproduction of authorized images in schedule 1 of the order of the
Departement federal de l'interieur concerning combined warnings on tobacco products
(RS 817.064).
4<1 Some ph.ilosophers have inferred from it an "heuristic method" (see the heuristics
of fear a~cordmg to Hans Jona8, Le prineipe responsabilite: une ethique pour la civihration
technologzque, Paris 2003 [transI.J [1979J).
42 Gere, Franyois, La guerre psychologique, Paris, 1997.
48 See, for example, l'effect of the alcopop tax on consumption of these beverages
(Feuilleflderak 200S 1984).
44 For the origin of theories on the effectiveness of such images, see Tchakhotine,
S., Le viol desfoules par la propagande politique, 1939, new ed., Paris, 1992; Ellul, Jacques,
Propagandes, Paris, 1990. Contra: Gervereau, L., Histoire du visuel au XXe siecle, Paris,
2003.
411 Asch, S. E., "Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of
judgment," H. Guetzkow (Ed.) Groups, leadership and men. Pittsburgh "1951; Doise, W,
Deschamps, I-C. and Mugny, G., Psychologie sociale experimentale, 2nd Ed., Paris, A. Colin,
1991, chapter 7. On the role of conformity in compliance with soft law in finance, see
Roth, Monika, Srift law: Ordnungsvisionen in flux: eine Standartbestimmung mit Fokus auf
compliancerelevante Fragestellungen, Berne 2006, p. 89.
46 Loomes, Grahaml Sugden, Robert, "Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of
Rational Choice Under Uncertainty," The Economic Journal, vol. 92, no 368, 1982, p.
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fear of disease in prevention campaigns against obesity; fear of the enemy
revealing its ferocity in military propaganda,42 ete.
In fact, these primal fears are not the only emotions that prompt individuals
to follow the behaviours advocated by such campaigns. Reality is not as clear-
cut. Effectiveness must be understood in combination with other tools.
including legal instruments. The effect of anti-smoking or anti-drinking
information campaigns is thus reinforced with special taxes on cigarette
packets and strong alcoho1.4s Parallel motivations sometimes meet, as with the
rate of protected sexual intercourse, a part of which can be attributed directly
to AIDS prevention campaigns while another part may stem from competing
motives such as a desire to assuage the fear of unwanted pregnancy, other
sexually transmitted diseases, or a criminal penalty.
The images used in such campaigns indisputably enhance their emotional
impact, as illustrated with anti-smoking and road accident prevention
campaigns. Nevertheless, the influence of images in a propaganda context is
controversial today.H
Finally, more generally, an individual may feel pressure to change from the
social group to which he belongs, if he fears conflict with the group. Social
psychologists eaU this attitude conformity."
Regret is also at play in obedience mechanisms, especially the anticipated
fear of regret or remorse that may arise from behaviour contrary to a
recommendation. Economists have even proposed a "theory of regret, "46
according to which the fear of regret (e.g., for an investor to miss a future
increase or sustain a later loss) leads to irrational decisions. Other examples of
regret or remorse include that felt after failing to wear a condom for risky
sexual intercourse or an earlier failure to sign one's organ donor card when
awaiting a transplant.
Legal mechanisms of usingfear in soft law instruments
The legal order may provide for legal mechanisms intended to strengthen
observance of soft law rules. This does not mean they become legally binding.
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At one end of the spectrum, this pressure may be very diffuse, political in
nature, like non-binding, informal arrangements intended to avoid a regulatory
act.. Examples include the gentlemen's agreements60 used by the Banque
natlOnale as of the 1930s61 or the industry-wide agreements 6ll used in
environmental law since the 1970s.U At the opposite end of the spectrum, the
pressure may be njuridicised", while remaining a fact, when there is a Damocles'
law. Thi~ t~p~ of law institutionalises the part of the agreement binding the
State to mdlVlduals by legally guaranteeing that tbe public body will not adopt
state regulation~ in a given area in return for the "voluntary" adoption of
aut?nomous pnvate regulations.64< Although individuals are not legally
obhgated to adopt a self-regulated solution, in reality, their behaviour is
dictated by fear that the State will enact less favourable regulations. There are
Yet the psychological mechanisms the law evokes can be similar to those of
binding instruments. There is a fine line between legal sanctions and the
l! 11 th t d'pressures a encourage non-man atory behavlOurs:I<7
This is the case of the financial pressure behind incentive taxes. These
involve non-mandatory recommendations, as well as payment of a sum of
money. They consist of dual components, imperative and non-imperative. The
advocated behaviour is not compulsory, but simply recommended. However, the
i~te.nded audience may perceive this instrument as a financial penalty very
SImIlar to regular legal penalties: individuals who fail to sort their waste must
pay a tax.48 The difference is that in the recommendational variant the
payment of a tax does not have the same symbolic scope as in the legal v;riant
where a fine is imposed. Fear of impoverishment or a desire to not waste
money, generated in both hypotheses, are doubled in the second variant of
anxiety that is specific to the commencement of a criminal trial symbolically
related to feelings of shame and guilt. In practice, however, the difference
tends t~ fade ea~h t~me small sums are at stake, to the extent that the legal
process IS then SImplIfied. The penalty is then perceived as "just a taxn!49
The pressure may also be .regulatory, decisional or jurisdictional in nature.
The targeted audience will obey from fear that the authorities will carry out
the threat to ado~t.~egulations, re~der a decision or institute proceedings. The
greater the credIbIhty of executmg the threat imminently, the greater the
effect.
47 Timsit, Gerard, "Sur l'engendrement du droit," Revue de droit public 1988, p. 49.
48 FIUckiger 2004 [note6], p. 249s.
4<9 Hart, H.L.A., Le concept de droi~ Brussels 1976, p. 58.
.110 P?ltier, Etienne, "Les gentlemen's agreements aparticipation publique," Revue de
drOIt suzsse I 1987, p. S96.
ill Z.ufferey; ~ea~-Baptiste,. La reglementation des systemes SUr les marches financiers
secondazres: contrzbutwn dogmatzque et comparatz've a!'elaboration d'un droit suisse des marches
financiers, Fribourg 1994, p. 318.
• 62 Pfenninger, Hanspeter, Rechtliche Aspekte des informellen Perwaltungshandelns,
Frrbourg, 1996, p. 26.
68 Examples in Fltickiger 2004 [note6], p. 213s,
6~ F1ilcki~er, Alexandre, "La loi Damocles," in Melanges en l'honneur de Pierre Moor:
Wone du drol~ droit administranf, organisation du territoire, Berne 2005, p. 233ss,
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By awarding prizes and distinctions to reward exemplary attitude (see, for
example, the order on the Prix du cinema suisse),65 authorities are indirectly
recommending the adoption of a specific behaviour. This kind of
Joy
Joy and other resulting positive emotions like pride, self-esteem, desire and
pleasure are emotions that can change the behaviour of individuals without
forcing them to do so.
This is the intent of all redistributive economic instruments that play on
the pleasure of winning money and the desire for profit. Thus, when a
recommendation is supported by state funding, the economic incentive
strengthens the recommendation's appreciative nature commensurate with the
sum at stake.
indignation, anger, rage or disgust, play on these same motives.62 The effect of
such p:rocesses for individuals can be far more painful than recourse to binding
legal Instruments, as the example of warnings against hazardous products
shows: the necessary advertising is clearly more detrimental to the
manufacturer than a simple notice of prohibited distribution, since the
manu,facturer's image is tarnished.68 Their effectiveness is questioned,
especIally as regards government stakeholders, as illustrated hy the
implementation of the open method of coordination in European law (non-
compulsory method of coordinating public policy).64
Information campaigns that play on the fear of deadly disease or accidents
often p~ovoke shame or guilt in their targeted audience, as do organ donation
promotIOns that make non-donors feel guilty for not wanting to save the lives
of others.
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62 Stein, Jana von, "'Naming and Shaming" in the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights: When and How Does it Matter?" Paper presented at the annual meeting rif
the International Studies A.uociation 48th Annual COnlJention (published on
www.allacademic.comlmetalp179882_index.html). The same process is used to
implement the open method of coordination (OMC) in European law (Collignon, Stefan
et al., "La Strategie de Lisbonne et la methode ouverte de coordination: 12
recommandations pour une strategie cl. plusieurs niveaux plus efficace," Policy paper no
12,2006, p. 10 [www.notre-europe.eu-rubriquetravauxJ).
~s Kautz, Steffen,. Absprach~n im Verwaltungsrecht.: Zllldssigkei~ Grenzen und Folgen,
Berlm 2002, p. 86, WIth ref. Clt. to German doctrine. See also ibidem, p. 156 et 281s;
Tschannen, Pierre, "Amtliche Warnungen und Empfehlungen," Revue de droit suisse 11
1999, p.432; NUtzi, Patrick, Recht.ifragen verha.lten.~lenkender staatlicher Informatt'on.'
Strukturen, Zuliissigkeit, Haftung: illustr£ert an den Beispielen AIDS und Listeriose, Berne
1995, p. 181ss
64 Implementation of the open method of coordination in European law is based on
apeer pressure system that [Trans.J "has notfunctioned correctly, partly due to thefact that
members do not wish to 'name and shame' their peers. Stakeholders are not very moUvated to
engag~ in this type if process: the various members fear they will make enemies and reap the
negatwe consequences in other political areas where they show little progress." (Collignon 2006
[note 62J, p. 10).
65 RS 443.116.
Fear of a trial is also an instrument that encourages parties not only to
reach a non-binding arrangement, but also to respect it.56 Effectiveness is
greater when the chances of success are high and the feared proceedings are
long and costly. The effectiveness of the right of recourse of environmental
protection organisations is based on this psychological mechanism. The
effectiveness of this right does not depend on its actual use, which is extremely
infrequent, but on the concrete threat of the right in the eyes of
manufacturers, due to its judicious and successful use. 57
When a court finds, or may find, that a given public or private
recommendation is applied in determining the limits of negligence or
carelessness, the fear of liability for unlawful acts, or even lawful acts, is a
powerful factor in encouraging an individual or an authority to respect a non-
binding instrument. Yet the intended audience remains free to choose another
behaviour and will only be affected aposteriori, that is, if damage occurs:'l8
Shame
So-called naming and shaming processes, which consist of publicly
denouncing individuals, organisations or States in order to provoke
examples of this in environmental law, energy law, film law, and consumer
law.~6
Evoking shame and guilt is commonplace in criminal law. Similarly, soft law
has the greatest effect in relation to the fear of experiencing these emotions.
Because damage to a company's reputation may cost it dearly, the corporate
irpage and an impeccable reputation must be maintained to avoid shame,
embarrassment or humiliation.59 The private economy can achieve this through
soft law instruments, like the Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate
GovernancelO or the many codes of ethics and good conduct adopted by certain
professions (lawyers, physicians, journalists, etc.), including the public
administration. 61
55 FlUckiger 2005 [previous noteJ, p. 233ss; Fltickiger 2004 [note 6J, p. 216.
66 Mtiller-Graf, Thomas, Entrechtlichung durch Informalisierung?: tin Beitrag zur
Handlungiformen- und zur Rechtsverhiiltnislehre im 1Terwaltungsrecht, Bale, etc. 2001, p. 174.
67 Fltickiger, Alexandre/Morand, Charles-Albert/Tanquerel, Thierry, Evaluation du
droit de recours des organisations de protection de l'environnement, Berne, 2000, p. 858S.
58 Fltickiger 2004 [note 6J, p. 254. Sur la responsabilite de l'Etat pour ses activites
non decisionnelles, see Schwarzenbach, Hans Rudolf, Staatshaftung bei verfilgungsfreiem
Verwaltungshandeln: mit praktischer Anleitung zum Vermeidenl1Termindern dieser wachsenden
Risiken (Riskmanagement), Berne 2006.
59 Roth, Monika, Sqft law: Ordnungsvisionen influx: eine Standortbestimmung mit Fokus
auj compliancerelevante Fragestellungen, Berne 2006, p. 10Sss.
60 Adopted March 25, 2002, by the apex organisation economiesuisse, setting a line
of conduct and formulating recommendations. Regarding codes of conducts for
multinationals, see Roth, Monika, Sqft law: Ordnungsvisionen in flux: tine
Standortbestimmung mit Fokus auj compliance relevante Fragestellungen, Berne 2006,· p.
13s& ~
61 Schindler, Benjamin, "Ethikilirderung in der Verwaltung: Modetrend oder
Notwendigkeit?," Schweizerisches Zentralblatt jUr Staats- und 1Terwaltungsrecht 2003,
p. 61ss.
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66 Baggio, Stephanie, Psychologie sodale, Brussels 2006, p. 22; Doise, w., Deschamps,
1.-C. and Mugny, G., Psychologie sociale experimentale, 2nd Ed., Paris, A. Colin, 1991,
chapter 7.
67 See Abi-Saab, Georges, "Cours general de droit international public," Recueil des
cours de l'Aeadbnie de droit internationa~ t. 207, 1997, p.207, 210. There is a simil;ir
phenomenon in hard law: legislative experimentation (FIUckiger, Alexandre, ''Voter,
elire et signer par Internet: le droit experimental arepreuve de la securite," in Journees
2002 d'informatique juridique, Berne 2003, p. 107ss [ref. cit.]). In German law, see
Maass, Volker, Experimentierklauseln fUr die TTerwaltung und ihre veifassungsreehtlichen
Grenzen: zugleich ein Beitrag zu § 7aBerlHG, Berlin 2001). '
68 Regarding such effects in planning, see FIUckiger, Alexandre, Le regime juridique
des plans: I'e.xempl-e du plan de gestion des dAchets, Berne, 1996, p. 117ss (ref. cit.).
Surprise
Soft law presents an interesting characteristic in this regard in comparison
with hard law, in that the former often has an experimental function to test a
potential future rule of law.67 This allows the 8tate to study the reaction of the
intended audience and either withdraw the tested measures or make them
permanent, depending on the observed impact. 80ft law thus accustoms
citizens, or gradually acclimatizes them, to a new regime by avoiding any
surprise on the day it evolves into hard law (smoking is first discouraged, then
prohibited in public places; helmets and seatbelts are first encouraged, then
imposed; etc.). We find a variant of this process when non-imperative planning
progressively creates accomplished facts that become increasingly difficult to
counter over time. 6B Certain manipulation techniques, like the door-in-the-face
technique or deceit, knowingly make use of the surprise effect.
recommendation plays on the recipient's joy, pride, pleasure, and even the
desirej envy or jealousy that such an award may arouseinothers.
Information campaigns may also aim to excite feelings of joy and
happiness: the pleasure of eating healthily to counter obesity; the joy of
watching a young athlete with a heart transplant promote organ donation; the
magic of a stroll in the shaded woods to prevent the death of forests.
Finally, we can revisit the phenomenon of social conformity discussed in
the section on fear. Conformity motivated by complacency-in which an
individual who fears conflict with the group prefers the pleasure of
peacec--must be distinguished from conformity motivated by identification.
The latter is based not on fear but on joy, pride or desire for recognition when
the individual conforms in order to establish his or her place in the group and
maintain positive relations with it in the hope of eventually obtaining prestige
and visibility.66
Finally, it should be noted that pleasure is an ambiguous emotion in this
context, since it is often a factor opposed to the implementation of soft law
rules. The individual is constantly required to balance the fears raised by an
anti-smoking or AIDS prevention campaign with the pleasure of smoking or
lovemaking without a condom.
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69 Davis, M. H., "Empathy," Stets, 1. E./ Turner, 1. H. (Ed.), Handbook of the Sociology
of Emotions, New York 2006, p. 443ss; Deonna, Julien, "The Structure of Empathy,"
Journal of Moral Philosophy 4.1, April 2007.
70 Guy-Ecabert, Christine, Procedure administrative et mUiation: inscription d'un modele
procedural dans un contexte en mutation, Zurich etc. 2002, p. 255.
71 Hammer, Raphael, ''Le traitement mediatique de la penurie et du don d'organes:
variations discursives et normatives dans la presse francophone suisse," contribution to
a collective work (Thiel, M.-1., Ed.), Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg (not yet
publisbed).
7'1. See the study by Annemarie Kesselring, cited in "L'art de parler dudon d'organes
avec les proches," Fonds National suisse - Horizons, June 2005, p. 19s.
78 See the compared effectiveness of awareness, persuasion and commitment
strategies in AIDS prevention as concerns condom use (Joule, Robert-Vincent;
Commitment theories show an efficacy, some say, that is potentially greater
than awareness and information strategies.78
Commitment theories
These techniques include commitment theories, strategic use of cognitive
dissonance, and context effects (contrast and compromise).
Soft law creates a gradual habituation that foils any subsequent surprise
any potential rejection that may result from surprises.
Empathy
Empathy is the psychological mechanism through which an individual
understands another's feelings and emotions, without feeling them himself.69
More specifically, it is the ability to feel emotions in general rather an emotion
per se~
Without doubt, empathy is indispensable to the success of non-legal
disputeresolution processes like mediation.70 It is also at play, with compassion,
sympathy or pity, in the use of biographic stories that facilitate emotional
expression by stirring the reader, thereby encouraging him to act in a specifIc
way. This technique is currently used in promotion campaigns for organ
donations in which the testimonies of transplant recipients add a human,
palpable aspect to the suffering of those awaiting organs, giving an emotional
face to the shortage of organ donors.71 In terms of the relationship between
medical staff and the donor's family, the rate of consent is higher when
doctors show empathy and lower when they behave coldly."
Instead of creating public awareness with emotional arguments that
modify behaviour without the rule of law, social psychologists have shown that
certain techniques are effective in manipulating individuals without their
knowledge and in making them choose to act in ways they otherwise would
not.
Manipulation techniques
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Beauvois, Jean-Leon, La soum£rsion librement consentie: comment amener les gens afaire
librement ce qu'ils doiventfaire?.5 th Ed., Paris 2006, p. 1.97ss).
74 C.A. Kiesler, The Psychology of Commitment, New York, 1971
75 Baggio, Stephanie, Psychologt"e sociale, Brussels 2006, p. 28.
76 Joule, Robert-Vincent; Beauvois, Jean-Leon, Petit traitA de manipulation al'usage des
honnetes gens, Grenoble 2002, p. 97ss.
77 Joule/Beauvois 2002 [note 76J, p. 117ss
78 Joule/Beauvois 2002 [note 76J, p. 53ss.
79 Joule/Beauvois 2002 [note 76J, p. 68ss.
80 Joule/Beauvois 2002 [note 76J, p. 160.
Such practices do not make direct use of individual emotions, but condition
emotions at the unconscious level, particularly through deceit, deception and
surprise. Contrary to hard law but like soft law, the subject is placed in a
situation that gives him a feeling of free choice. This perception of freedom is
a determining factor in the success of manipulation techniques. The individual
must believe he is making a free, informed decision without being influenced,
despite behaving differently than he would have without the unseen
manipulation. Commitment theories are the basis for such processes.H The
principle is that the subject's conduct is determined by one or more earlier
behaviours that are elicited without his knowledge. Subjects become caught up
in the process, one ·that is increasingly difficult to halt as time advances.75
Several methods can be used:
The foot-in-the-door technique, which consists of making an initial trivial
request before the main request. The trivial request involves little cost and
is not necessarily related to the main request (for example, asking the time);
the subject is then asked to perform the desired action, which he likely
would have refused had it not been preceded by the initial request. 76
The door-in-the-face technique, which on the contrary consists of making
an initial excessive, though not abusive, request before the main request in
order to obtain less; in fact, the "less ll is exactly what the requestor wants.
The effect of calming surprise gives the subject an illusion of gain that
makes him statistically more likely to consent.77
Priming, which consists of getting an individual to agree to an action, the
true cost of which is initially concealed and revealed fully only at a later
time. 78
Deception, a variant of priming, in which the requestor asks the subject to
perform an attractive behaviour the requestor knows to be impossible, then
informs him of that fact and proposes an alternative that is more costly and
that the requestor initially had in mind·79
In order to achieve the desired effect, the individual must believe himself to
be free. Empirical research in social psychology has shown that explicitly
telling someone they are free to choose significantly increases the rate of a
proposal's acceptance. The tlsense of freedom ll thus becomes an elegant
manipulation technique in itself.80 Soft law is based on exactly this type of
reaction because it is defined as not legally mandatory. Equally relevant is the
concept of psychological reactance, in which individuals, who believe their
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The ethics of authorities using such techniques is highly debatable,
particularly those techniques based on deceit and deception, since they may be
contrary to the constitutional principles of good faith and proportionality.
Strategic use of cognitive dissonance (effect of the dnty to state reasons)
According to the cognitive dissonance theory, an individual feels
uncomfortable when faced with contradictory I1 cognitions,!t where cognition
refers to a person's knowledge of self, behaviour and environment.87 This state
of unpleasant tension motivates the individual to reduce dissonance in order to
achieve cognitive balance (or consonance).
Some methods of reducing cognitive dissonance have been used
strategically to modify individuals' behaviour. This is the case when a person is
asked to explain a solution he does not support, in which case he tempers his
final position in an effort to harmonize his behaviour with his ideas. s8
81 Baggio [note 66J,-p, 66ss.
82 Joule/Beauvois 2006 [note 73J, p. 95ss.
8S loulelBeauvois 2006 [note nJ"p. 110ss.
84 Joule/Beauvois 2006 [note 73J, p. 127ss.
85 Joule/Beauvois 2006 [note 73J, p. 142ss.
86 Eyssartier, ChIDe, Du don de sang au don d'organes: une recherche appliquee,
Universite d1Aix-Mar8eille (http://slhs.univ-fcomte.fr I rech/psycho
I colloquelsocial!resurnes.htm#e).
87 Festinger, Leon, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Evanston [etc.J 1957, p. 9.
88 Baggio [note 66J, p. 62ss. .
89 Huber, J./ Payne, IWI Puto, C., "Adding asymmetrically dominated alternatIves:
Violations of regularity and the similarity hypothesis," Journal of Consumer r:esearch,
1982, 9, p. 90ss; Simonson, "Choice Based on Reason: The Case of AttractlOn and
Compromise Effects," Journal of Consumer Research, .1989, 16,'p' 1.588S. ..
90 Schweizer, Mark, "Kontrast- und KompromIsseffekt lm Recht am Belsplel der
lebenslanglichen Verwahrung," ZStrR 4/200.5,' p. 4385S; Kelman, M./ Rottenstreich, Y.I
Context effects (contrast and compromise effects)
Context effects (contrast and compromise effects) introduce biases into the
decision-making process. These effects have been used in marketing since its
inception89 and have been tested recently in the legal decision process.90
behavioural freedom is being diminished, manage to resist attempts at
persuasion.81
These techniques tend to be used to support information and persuasion
campaigns. They have been tested successfully in the area of energy efficiency
in encouraging people to turn lights off when no longer needed and to tu~n
down heating instead of opening windows when they are hot,S2 as well as In
the area of occupational health and safety to encourage workers to wear
hearing protectors in noisy environments, 8S in the area of AIDS prevention to
encourage use of condoms84 and undergo testing,85 and to promote organ
donation.86
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'Nith the contrast ifJect, the same option is assessed more positively in the
:I"r~s,:enceof similar, less favourable alternatives than in the absence of such
~hoices.91 This effect exists optically with the Ebbinghaus Illusion: a circle of
the same diameter is perceived as being smaller when surrounded by, larger
circles.
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97 See www.swisstransplant.ch
98 Nye, Joseph, Bound to Lead· The Changing Nature of American Power, New York
1990.
99 Joule/Beauvois 2006 [note 73J, p. 202.
100 In detail on this proposal, see FlUckiger 2004 [note 6J, p. 262ss.
101 Fllickiger 2004 [note 6J, p. 270S8.
Conclusion
States have long been aware that conventional legal instruments are
occasionally ineffective in piloting public policy. Soft power98 is rediscovered,
thematised and used with sometimes startling effectiveness, particularly in
synergy with conventional legal means. Soft law has an even greater impact
because its persuasive strategies involve skilful use of emotions, and even
manipulation techniques.
The question is this: To what degree can authorities use emotions to
increase the rate of compliance with soft law instruments, knowing that, in a
constitutional state, they are less democratically legitimate than legislative and
regulatory means? As such, the State cannot employ just any manipulation
method to develop transplant medicine. However, as we see in road safety
communication campaigns, it can certainly bank on the heuristics of fear by
showing an hypothetical catastrophe leading to an accident, in order to make it
more probable in the eyes of the targeted audience. 99
Soft law's effects, as measured by the emotions they evoke, show that non-
legally binding instruments can compel obedience. An absence of legal effects
in the conventional sense would therefore not exempt them from the adoption
of an adapted legitimation and control system, like that which has applied to
the rules of hard law in constitutional states for a long time. Consequently, soft
law instruments should be subject-relatively speaking and based on their
effects, including emotional effect&--to the material principles of the
constitutional state,IOO such as legality, action in the public interest, good faith
and proportionality, the requirement of fair and non-discriminatory treatment,
the prohibition of arbitrary action, as well as formal rules like the definition of
specially adapted procedural guarantees like recourse to mediation or, in
certain cases, legal processes. IOI Public consultation and participation
mechanisms should also be developed when adopting soft law rules, like citizen
forums and consensus conferences, so as to establish a true "administrative
These conclusions can be transposed to the area of soft law. This type of
reaction is counted on with Switzerland's new organ donor card, which offers
three options:97 authorization for removal of all organs, non-authorization and,
as the intermediate alternative, selective donation with boxes to check for
various organs (heart, lungs, liver, kidneys, small intestine, pancreas, cornea,
skin and other tissues and cells). Although not confirmed by a study, one can
reasonably hypothesize that the presence of an intermediate option will be
considered more favourably.
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The compromise iffect results from the observation that the same option is
assessed more favourably when seen as the middle solution in a group of
alternatives than when presented as an extreme.92
A first American experiment showed that, based on the same established
facts, the probability of being found guilty of murder rose from 38% to 56%
when capital murder is among the choice of offences.9 .'1 This compromise effect
means that the accused risks receiving a higher sentence when the law
provides for capital murder, even if he is not found guilty of that offence.94
The experiment was repeated with similar results with 230 civil and criminal
judges in the cantons of BUe, Berne and Graublinden. Their rulings based on
the same established facts were compared depending on whether life
imprisonment was among the available criminal penalties.9s Introducing an
extreme option among the range of potential solutions increases the
proportion in favour of the median solution.96
Tversky, A., "Context-dependence in legal decision making," in Sunstein, Cass,
Behavioral Law and Economics, Cambridge [etc.J 2000, p. 61 ss;
91 Kelman et al. 2000 [note 90J, p. 61.
9.2 Kelman et al. 2000 [note 90J, p. 61; Simonson 1989 [note 89J.
98 Kelman et al2000 [note 90J, p. 67.
94 Schweizer 2005 [note 90J, ch. V, lit. A.
95 Schweizer 2005 [note 90J, ch. VI.
96 Schweizer 2005 [note 90J, ch. VI, lit. C.
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democracy."lM Greater legitimacy for such instruments would make them more
effective, as research in social psychology has shown. 109
This conclusion in no way detracts from the legitimacy of soft law's use of
emotions, or even certain non-problematic, well targeted manipulation
techniques. It simply requests a legal framework suited to the specificities of
non-binding state instruments in order to avoid circumventing the principles
of a constitutional state. Otherwise, soft law's very effectiveness would simply
be challenged, given the importance and scope of its emotional effects.
102 Flilckiger 2004 [note 6J, p. 275s8
lOS See the work of Tyler .2006 [note 19J regarding compliance with law, but whose
conclusions may be transposed to soft law in our opinion.
CHAPTER 3
The Impact of Direct Democracy 011 Public
Policies: a Historical Perspective
WOLFLINDER
Introduction
Political scientists analysing direct democracy have been preoccupied wi'
the citizens' political behaviour, their motivation for participation, their valu'
and interests, the shaping of the voters preferences in the campaigns i
political parties and other factors that determine the outcomes of the dire
participation process. Thus, the mainstream of direct democracy research
theoretically and methodologically, much in line with the research on elector
behaviour. Less attention, however, has been paid to the impacts of citizer
direct participation on public policies. This question is relevant for two reasor
First, in the course of the development of the Swiss polity from 184<8 to 01
days, the institutions of direct democracy have been gradually opened to ne
categories of parliamentary decisions, and thresholds of launching referenl
became lower. Thus, one might expect that more and more decisions (
parliament have to be ratified by the people before they can be enacted. Indee
in the end of the 19th century, we find hardly more than one popular vote p
year, while today, the people have almost ten opportunities to say their "Yes" I
"No" to constitutional amendments or laws. Second, we observe a tremendo
secular change of federal policies. In the 19th century, the competencies of tl
Federation were limited to an almost "minimal state", and the fathers of tl
Swiss constitution intended that federal policies should be implemented by ti
cantons. 'Until World War n, federal competencies were extended only slow
This changed completely in the second half of the 20th century, when fedel
responsibilities were extended -or developed in all fields-economic, soci
infrastructural, and environmental regulations and policies as well. From
"minimal state", the Swiss Federation has become a modernized intervention:
State like others. Yet, despite this development, direct democracy is used
ever and still is functioning.
These secular trends-the continuous opening of parliamentary decisio
to direct participation of the people, and the growing importance of fedel
policies-give raise to several questions which are addressed in this article:
How did the relationship between direct democracy and federal polici
evolve over time? Did the opening of direct participation lead to a high
